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President of the European Central Bank
In my introductory remarks I would first like to reflect
on the lessons that I believe we can draw from today’s
financial and economic crisis. In the second part, I
will touch on the current situation, and describe the
three key steps that I believe we need to take to return
to the path of economic stability.
Lessons of the financial crisis 
The financial crisis has taught us painful lessons. It
has revealed fundamental weaknesses in our global
financial system. In the years that led up to the crisis,
the European Central Bank was among those institu-
tions that warned against the under-pricing of risk in
financial markets. But the growing complexity of the
global financial system and specifically its interna-
tional linkages made it difficult to predict how and
when developments would turn.
With hindsight we know a great deal about the
causes of the crisis. Financial innovation led to the
development of new instruments that were intend-
ed to expand the diversification of risk for savers
and investors. In retrospect, we know that instead
they contributed to a common exposure to systemic
risk.
Gradually, the focus of finance shifted in the recent
past. From its traditional role of helping the real
economy to cope with economic risk, finance became
a self-referential activity. The notion of ‘financial
engineering’ is a striking illustration of the shift of
attitudes that spearheaded the changing focus of
finance. When I started my professional career, no one
would have used this expression. Engineering is about
building tangible structures that support human
endeavours. Some of the structures that were invented
in finance turned out to be neither tangible nor help-
ful to society.
Nevertheless, the vast expansion of the financial sec-
tor would not have been possible without both sup-
portive macroeconomic conditions and inadequate
prudential regulation. Global current account imbal-
ances have generated large financial flows, as large
developed countries sucked in massive capital flows
from oil exporting and emerging economies.
Seemingly bright macroeconomic prospects combined
with deregulation and global conditions of over-
extended credit.
The crisis has shown that deregulation does not
always pave the way for greater efficiency and greater
prosperity. Rather we have rediscovered the value of
properly functioning regulatory and supervisory insti-
tutions. And we have also rediscovered the value of
medium-term orientation, sustainability and stability.
Consequences of the financial crisis
The consequences to be drawn to minimise the risk of
a comparable crisis in the future are numerous and
wide-ranging. First, comprehensive regulatory
reforms of the financial system have to be implement-
ed with top priority. While some progress has been
already made, major challenges lie ahead. Most
importantly, the pro-cyclicality of the financial sys-
tem must be mitigated. It is essential to change regu-
latory and accounting rules that tend to amplify the
natural cyclical swings of our economies.
Second, we have to enhance the transparency of
financial structures. That concerns rules of disclosure
as well as market infrastructure. In particular, deriva-
tive market instruments need to be subject to greater
transparency. But, beyond changes in financial gover-
nance, there needs to be a deeper economic assess-
ment of the benefits of these structures to society.
And third, incentives should be aligned. Remunera-
tion schemes, for example, should support sustainable
business rather than myopic trading.
There is one over-arching issue that I would like to
highlight: the financial industry has to reconsider its
role in the economy. Returning to a role of serving theCESifo Forum 3/2010 9
Introduction
real economy would be desirable. ‘Financial engi-
neers’ may prefer to create ever more ‘sophisticated’
financial products. But finance has to come back to
the basics. Among the basic tasks of the financial
industry is the supply of credit to the real economy.
This too is a profitable business, the profits from
which are justified because they are mirrored by the
social value of the intermediation function.
Businesses and individuals depend in particular on
the steady supply of credit by banks.
The ECB and the national central banks of the euro
area have taken comprehensive measures during the
crisis to help commercial banks and other financial
institutions. When the turbulence started in August
2007, the ECB was the first central bank to step in by
frontloading liquidity.
After the intensification of the crisis in the autumn of
2008, we tackled the paralysis of inter-bank transac-
tions in the money market. In addition to a swift and
substantial reduction of our policy rate, in line with
our primary objective of maintaining price stability
over the medium term, we decided to implement a set
of non-standard measures, which we collectively refer
to as ‘enhanced credit support’. These measures have
significantly helped to maintain banks’ liquidity. But
we did not pursue this policy with the ultimate goal of
reconstructing banks’ profitability. Rather, the pur-
pose of our enhanced credit support has been to
ensure the transmission of monetary policy transac-
tions to the broader economy.
Global economic governance
The crisis has important implications for economic
governance, and here remarkable efforts have been
made or are under way. On the global level, the G20
has become the main forum for international coop-
eration, and a strong consensus has emerged within
this group not only about the causes of the crisis but
also about the appropriate policy responses. The
G20 has been highly effective in addressing the glob-
al crisis.
The more technical questions concerning regulation
and financial stability are mainly delegated to the
Financial Stability Board (FSB). The extension of
both the membership and the range of tasks of the
previous Financial Stability Forum have pushed the
FSB into a leading role when it comes to coordinating
the reform of financial regulation.
The European regulatory response to the crisis will
include a new body that will provide macroprudential
oversight and focus on the avoidance of systemic risk
in the financial system of the European Union as a
whole. This is the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB), the establishment of which intends to make
macro-prudential oversight operational at the
European level.
While the ECB and the national central banks of the
EU will be heavily involved in the ESRB framework,
it is essential to make a clear separation between
macro-prudential oversight and monetary policy. The
primary objective of euro area monetary policy will
remain the maintenance of price stability.
Financial stability lays the conditions for the central
bank to pursue its task of maintaining stable prices. It
is also the outcome of an environment of steady
macroeconomic prospects and confidence, which only
stable prices can ensure.
Current challenges for European integration
Although the financial crisis did not originate here, it
has profoundly challenged the European economy –
and it is continuing to do so. Economic and Monetary
Union – in short: EMU – is a union based on two
foundations: economic and monetary. These are two
foundations that reinforce one another. Responsibility
for the ‘M’ is centralised and assigned to the
Eurosystem with the ECB at its core, aiming to ensure
price stability in the euro area over the medium term.
We have defined price stability as an average annual
inflation rate below but close to 2 percent over the
medium term.
How have we performed against this objective since
the introduction of the euro? Based on current staff
projections for this year, by the end of 2010, the
average inflation rate in the euro area since the
introduction of the euro is estimated to be around
1.95 percent. Beyond the ups and downs of the eco-
nomic cycle since 1999, despite the swings in the
international prices of raw materials, monetary pol-
icy has managed to keep its inflation record faithful
to its strategic aim. I am satisfied that we have ful-
filled our mandate. For Germany I would like to
recall that the average annual inflation rate in this
country was 2.2 percent in the 1990s compared to
2.9 percent in the 1980s. Given the initial promise
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as credible, reliable and as good a store of value as
were the best of the national currencies, based on
these figures, I can say that with an estimated aver-
age annual inflation rate of 1.95 percent for the first
twelve years, the euro is in terms of safeguarding
purchasing power ‘stark wie die D-Mark’.
In a nutshell, the ‘M’ has done its part. The main cur-
rent challenges for our union originate in the ‘E’.
Economic union is based on responsible national
policies: fiscal policies, wage policies and structural
policies. At the core of the economic union is the
Stability and Growth Pact.
The crisis has revealed some of the shortcomings of
national policies to comply with the requirements of
an economic union. In particular, in a number of
cases, national policies that are responsible for
domestic public finances and for the competitive-
ness of member economies have not achieved their
objectives.
But the crisis has also revealed weaknesses in the peer
surveillance process and in the implementation of the
Stability and Growth Pact. Thus another major lesson
of the crisis is the need to strengthen the institutional
framework of the economic union.
Of course, the deterioration of public budgets has
partly been due to a ‘migration’of risk from the finan-
cial sector to the public sector. Public budgets have
been called on to absorb the excessive risk that the
financial industry had been creating during the boom-
ing years that led up to the crisis.
Partly, however, the deterioration of public budgets is
also due to some short-sighted fiscal and economic
decisions in the brighter times that preceded the crisis.
Before the crisis, weak public finances had combined
in some countries with inattention to domestic com-
petitiveness and a lack of long-term strategies to pre-
pare national economies for competing successfully in
the challenging – but rewarding – environment of the
internal market. In Greece, in particular, past fiscal
irresponsibility and inattentiveness to domestic com-
petitiveness made the national economy extraordinar-
ily vulnerable to a sudden turn in confidence.
As I have implied, after the crisis, the main players in
the world economy will be judged by a new yardstick.
Private players will be held accountable to new and
stricter standards of economic integrity and prudent
management. And governments, the world over – and
in Europe in particular – will have to show self-disci-
pline and trustworthiness to gain respect and preserve
confidence.
That is why financial reform will have to go hand in
hand with fiscal reform. Fiscal reform will reinforce
confidence. In the current situation, we have to – and
we do – stand firm on these principles.
Speculation on more and more elevated sovereign risk
has been one factor behind spreads being driven to
very high levels. This is why it was very important that
the heads of state and government declared on
11 February 2010 that they were ready to “take deter-
mined and coordinated action, if needed, to safe-
guard financial stability in the euro area as a whole”.
I said, on behalf of the ECB, that I approved this
important statement.
In this respect let me stress the following facts: loans
are not transfers, and loans come at a cost. They come
not only at a financial cost, but also with a strict con-
ditionality. This conditionality needs to give assur-
ance to lenders, not only that they will be repaid but
also that the borrower will be able to stand on its own
feet over a multi-year horizon. In the case of Greece,
this will require courageous, recognisable and specific
actions by the Greek government that will lastingly
and credibly consolidate the public budget.
Other countries in the EU and elsewhere have gone
through times that were no less difficult, and they
have emerged from a determined adjustment stronger
and more competitive than in the past. These coun-
tries have demonstrated that a clear U-turn in nation-
al policy governance is achievable. After making the
turn, they have reaped large payoffs.
I will not comment on the negotiations that are cur-
rently taking place in Athens. Again they have to be
concluded by a courageous, comprehensive and con-
vincing multi-year programme. And I am confident as
regards the results of these discussions between the
Greek government, the European Commission, the
ECB and the International Monetary Fund.
Let me add a word about Germany and the current
public debate here. I very much appreciated the invi-
tation by Finance Minister Schäuble on 28 April 2010
to speak to the floor leaders of all political parties
represented in the Bundestag. I said in Berlin that I
had found this meeting – in which Jürgen Stark and I
could respond to all questions of our interlocutors –CESifo Forum 3/2010 11
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extremely important. My main message was that a
fast parliamentary procedure was highly recommend-
ed in the present circumstances.
What we need most at this time is a strong sense of
direction. We need a sense of direction that can
guide us on how we can emerge from these turbulent
events and how we can return to the path of eco-
nomic stability.
In my view, this sense of direction can be provided in
three steps: first, in the case of Greece, a strong and
credible programme, negotiated among the Euro-
pean Commission, the ECB, the IMF and the Greek
government. Second, the support I have mentioned
that will avoid the materialisation of financial risks
for the euro area as a whole. And third, a giant step
forward in our own framework of surveillance, peer
pressure and policy adjustment within the monetary
union.
Speaking in the presence of Federal President Köhler,
who played such a decisive role in creating monetary
union and the former Finance Minister Theo Waigel,
the father of the Stability and Growth Pact, I must say
that I count on the contribution of Germany with
regard to the third step – the leap forward in policy
surveillance and policy adjustment.
Fiscal adjustment alone will not be sufficient to
ensure sustainability. Structural reforms that will lead
to more balanced growth are also vital to rebuild the
resilience of our economies. The result must therefore
be a renewal of the Stability and Growth Pact and the
incorporation of a framework of surveillance for
national policies of competitiveness. I hope that con-
siderable energy will be devoted to this area in this
country, so that a central outcome of the present
demanding episode will be to strengthen the founda-
tions of our monetary union.
Conclusion
Europe has reacted with speed, energy and determi-
nation in the financial crisis. We have to stay on this
path. We continue to need wise and sound, rapid and
determined action by all countries.
We need to resolutely improve the effectiveness of the
peers’ surveillance of fiscal and economic policies.
The weak points of past multilateral surveillance will
be corrected, and the Stability and Growth Pact will
be reinforced and rigorously applied in its letter and in
its spirit. It has to spot at an early stage and to correct
deviant behaviours. The overall scope of peers’ sur-
veillance should be resolutely broadened to include
the competitiveness as well as structural reforms of
individual countries, so as to maintain healthy and
sustainable growth as the ECB has constantly asked
for during the past year. 
In doing so we will pave the way for a European
economy which will have a higher level of growth
potential, and which will be prosperous, stable and
resilient.
The introduction of the single currency represents
the greatest achievement to date in the history of
European integration – a process that has ensured
six decades of peace and prosperity in Europe.
Countries that share a common currency share a
common destiny.